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Abstract: What are the lessons from the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
from a forward-looking point of view? A decade of negotiations is likely to
go nowhere. This paper argues that absence of a landing-zone was in the data.
Quantitative tools modelling the detail of the modalities predicted failure but were
not taken seriously: the design of the negotiations implied that any achievements
of the Round could only be limited. Such a weakness was induced by the way
multilateral negotiations were organized – in separate groups, without much
consideration for, or understanding of, how the different elements added up
to more than the sum of the parts. We put sensible ﬁgures on that argument by
using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the world economy,
addressing exceptions, ﬂexibilities, as well as the non-linear design of the
liberalization formulas, a reduction in domestic support, the phasing out of
export subsidies in agriculture, and trade facilitation. Our conclusion is that
negotiators have to go back to simplicity and re-bundle the topics if they wish
to revamp multilateral negotiations.
1. Introduction
A decade of multilateral trade negotiations has gone nowhere. What do we learn
from this failure? We know from recent analyses of the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA) that the very design of the negotiations, combining complex modalities,
extensive exemptions, attempts to rebalance concessions through sectoral
initiatives, and efforts to decouple deals, led to failure (Wolfe, 2015; Laborde and
Martin, 2015). In this article, we put precise ﬁgures on the dilemma of ﬁnding ways
of conducting negotiations to reach a deal that delivers gains big enough to make
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the negotiation worth the induced political cost of concessions. We show that the
absence of a landing zone is clearly revealed by careful modelling of the likely
impacts of the potential deals that were being considered. Results of such
quantitative modelling exercises were not taken seriously, even though they
provided early warning signals to the negotiators. We argue that the same is true
for the late stage effort in early 2011 pushed by the US administration and partially
endorsed by the European Commission to introduce sectoral liberalization
initiatives in the ﬁnal package. Emerging economies were reluctant to sign up
to such initiatives because they could have had sizeable impacts on some of the
sectors concerned.
On 29 March 2011, the Director General of the WTO declared that ‘[it was]
time . . . to reﬂect on the consequences of failure’, stating that ‘The absence of
progress in NAMA sectorals constitutes today a major obstacle to progress on to
the remaining market access issues.’ By June 2011, it was clear that completion of
a comprehensive agreement on all the DDA topics was impossible by the end of
that year. The 8th WTOMinisterial Conference in December 2011, welcoming the
accession of Russia (as well as Samoa and Montenegro), did not have an ‘in-depth
debate about the DDA’ according to the then Director General, Pascal Lamy. In
2013, his successor, Roberto Azevedo, managed to convince WTO Members to
reach a deal on a limited number of issues at the WTO Ministerial Conference in
Bali (December 2013), including on trade facilitation. But hopes for a revitalized
negotiating effort to conclude the DDA were again dashed in the course of 2014.
The world economy has changed dramatically since the launch of the DDA in
2001. A number of emerging economies have become major players. The 2008
global ﬁnancial crisis, and its aftermath, implied a major shock to the global
economy and has lowered growth prospects in some regions. The signiﬁcant
changes in the geopolitical context raise many questions concerning the funda-
mentals of the WTO which are unlikely to be addressed in the 12-month period
negotiators agreed on in Bali (Aggarwal and Evenett, 2013; Bureau and Jean, 2013).
One of the big obstacles to a deal is that negotiators have been constrained by
a too small negotiating set (Evenett, 2014). If the conclusion is that the landing
zone is indeed too small, then the implication is new issues need to be added.
Alternatively, the problem may be more of an artefact of the way negotiations were
organized (and analysed) –meaning separately for agriculture, non-agricultural
market access (NAMA), services, and trade facilitation. Negotiating in separate
groups, without much understanding of how the different elements added up
to more than the sum of the parts, has been an incentive for introducing
several exceptions and sensitive issues making it difﬁcult to ultimately deliver.
Rebundling the topics would be justiﬁed by a new pattern of the world economy:
the fragmentation of production (Baldwin, 2011; Hoekman, 2014a). Given the
increasing importance of Global Value Chains – a new reality of the world
economy tightly linking developed, emerging, and developing economies in goods
and services trade – there is shared interest of exporters and importers in securing
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market access and facilitating trade, which reinforces the need to make progress
on the fronts of trade facilitation and services.1 The empirical relevance of this
nexus is illustrated by the (non)-proliferation of protectionist measures after the
trade collapse of 2008–9. This is not only due to WTO disciplines, but reﬂects
the interdependence of countries within global chains, which reduced incentives
to use protectionism in response to the crisis (see Gawande et al., 2014).2
Our argument is that beyond the lack of political commitment to conclude
the Round – tactical errors, or the deleterious climate created by the global crisis
after 2008 – most of the difﬁculties of the DDA were intrinsic to the design of
the negotiations. While effort was devoted initially to designing general liberal-
ization formulae, exceptions to shield products and sectors and countries from
the domestic political economy consequences of the resulting systematic cuts
in protection ignored consideration of the overall gains of concluding the
Round (Laborde and Martin, 2015). General formulas gave rise to demands for
exceptions, including country-speciﬁc provisions to reﬂect the inability of the WTO
membership of addressing the issue of graduation from developing country status.
Some countries demanded additional ﬂexibilities; (very) recently acceded members
negotiated differential treatment as they had already committed to phase out a
signiﬁcant part of their protection; the least developed countries (LDCs) were
exempted from tariff reductions; and provisions were also included for small and
vulnerable economies and countries with low levels of tariff binding. As general
(MFN) tariff reductions are a source of preference erosion, speciﬁc solutions were
sought for the affected countries, which in turn might well harm countries that did
not beneﬁt from preferential access. All in all, any text combining all these elements
would not only be very complex for many countries, it would not lead to an
improvement in market access signiﬁcant enough to justify the negotiation effort.
Bagwell and Staiger (2011) argue there is a ‘latecomer problem’. Given initial
starting points in terms of levels of protection and the fact that the principle of
SDT applies to all developing countries, they suggest there is no way of reaching
a balanced deal on trade in goods only. Within the narrow negotiating agenda on
goods trade, negotiators from major developed countries raised requests for deeper
tariff reductions (on a voluntary basis) and other ‘zero tariff initiatives’ in the last
stages of the negotiations, before they broke down once again. The purpose was to
restore more ‘reciprocity’ in the concessions. But such ‘rebalancing’ would have
imposed a sharp redistribution in the gains and concessions among the players;
there was ultimately no landing zone for the negotiations without considering
a broader agenda including services and trade facilitation.
1 Karmakar (2013) acknowledges the importance of negotiating with GVCs in mind, but suggests to
close the Round as soon as possible in to order to launch a speciﬁc Round on that issue.
2 Using trade and protection data for a series of large emerging countries, Gawande et al. (2014) show
that participation in Global Value Chains was a powerful economic factor determining countries’ trade
policy responses to the trade collapse.
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This view is shared by many commenters and experts. Our contribution here
is to put numbers on the impasse and discuss implications for the way forward.
We conduct an exercise to quantify the economic impact of a deal. We integrate the
most recent proposals circulated in the DDA and calculate the possible gains to be
reaped. Our results regarding the magnitude of the global gains associated with a
successful Round are even more pessimistic than the previous literature assessing
the economic impact of a successful Doha Round.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the quantifying
assumptions. Overall results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Sources and quantifying assumptions
The intricate nature of the proposals discussed by WTO negotiators over the past
decade, which include numerous exceptions to a series of rules applied at product
level, imposes a speciﬁc modelling strategy. The state of the art in the applied trade
literature is measurement of border protection for goods at the most detailed level
possible (product, importer, exporter), and computation of liberalization resulting
from a tariff-cutting formula. Bound and applied duties (whether ad valorem,
speciﬁc, mixed, or compound) need to be measured at the HS-6 product level
(the most disaggregated level for which harmonized information is available). In
contrast, detailed information on trade facilitation is sparse and one must rely on
cruder estimates. This is also the case for the other potential big chunk of the gains
to be expected, namely trade in services. In the latter case, information on the exact
impact of regulatory measures is much less disaggregated than for goods, and
strong assumptions must be made to extract quantiﬁed measures from the existing
qualitative evidence on regulations. We examine the impact of the scenarios
by taking into account interactions between sectors, countries, and markets, which
is done with MIRAGE (Decreux and Valin, 2007), a dynamic CGE model of the
world economy that allows for imperfect competition.4 It is only when all these
elements of complexity are jointly taken into account that the reasons for the failure
can convincingly be assessed.
Negotiating design for goods and services
The creativity demonstrated by negotiators to ﬁnd a politically acceptable deal was
very impressive, but it resulted in adding layers of complexity to the negotiations
and greatly reduced the transparency of the process. A very simple modality,
3 Francois et al. (2005) obtain a 5% to 11% increase in world trade and a 0.3% to 0.5% increase in
world GDP. Bouët and Laborde (2010b) estimate hypothetical outcomes of the Doha Round. In their most
ambitious scenario, world output grows by 0.4%.
4MIRAGE relied in this exercise on GTAP-8 data for 2004. The 2004 picture of the world protection
takes account assumes implementation of the EU−Korea free trade agreement.
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such as use of a non-linear tariff cut formula applied to every tariff line as opposed
to negotiating product by product, is a very convenient design to start with. If
properly calibrated, such a measure can have a signiﬁcant effect in lowering tariff
peaks and, accordingly, greatly reduce induced distortions. It simpliﬁes negotiation
over reciprocal concessions among the large number of participating countries.
However, exceptions necessarily arise due to internal resistance among negotiating
countries.5 Minimum or maximum average cuts are then added to the liberalization
scheme. Less strict treatment was proposed for small and vulnerable economies;
membership of a customs union implied speciﬁc treatments for some members
as well as a number of exceptions. Speciﬁc issues, such a tropical products or tariff
escalation, were addressed by modiﬁcations to the general pattern of modalities.
Flexibilities followed some rules to ensure that some tariffs would be reduced in
all HS chapters. All these issues are taken into consideration in the analysis that
follows, which seeks to accurately characterize the complexity of the negotiating
set that led to the deadlock.
Sectoral initiatives concerning chemicals, machinery, and electronic products
deserve special attention, as this negotiating device was used in an effort to
rebalance concessions in a simple way. These are considered in two of our
scenarios.6 For services, three problems have to be tackled. First, negotiators
devoted limited effort to that area, so that little was known regarding the possible
contours of a successful deal. Thus, we are obliged to rely on partial information
and to assume what could be the ultimate achievements. Second, we do not have for
services the kind of information that we can rely on for barriers to trade in goods.
Services trade is impeded by regulatory obstacles for which tariff equivalents must
be computed as a ﬁrst step. We use here estimates by Fontagné et al. (2011). Third,
there is a big question regarding the proper modelling of the effects of regulatory
barriers, especially whether they are rent-creating or cost-enhancing. In communi-
cation and transport, we assume regulatory barriers allow selected companies to
increase their proﬁt margins to their own beneﬁt. This is modelled as an export
tax, thus mostly beneﬁting the exporting country. In other services, barriers are
assumed to be cost-increasing, and are modelled as implying an additional
iceberg trade cost. In other words, the barriers imply a need for additional inputs
of all types (intermediate consumption and factors) to deliver the service to its
ﬁnal user.
Modelling of the modalities
The reference situation over the whole period is deﬁned by the trajectory of
the world economy up to 2013 forecast by the International Monetary Fund.
5 The designation of exceptions had to follow certain rules (e.g. non-concentration clauses).
6 Laborde (2011) also tackled the sectoral initiatives, using a slightly different deﬁnition.
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From 2013 onwards, we use the forecast by CEPII based on a three-factor (labour,
capital, energy) growth model (Fouré et al., 2013). In this model, total population
and labour force are from the usual sources (International Labour Organization
and United Nations), human capital formation is forecast on the basis of a
catching up process, investment relies on savings, savings are derived from a life
cycle assumption, and total factor productivity (TFP) and energy efﬁciency are also
forecast. Population and GDP are imposed on MIRAGE for every country or
region and TFP adjusts endogenously at country level in the pre-experiment, with
no difference between sectors. We perform simulations of various shocks using
these TFP changes as exogenous variables. The oil (and primary resources) price is
endogenous in the model and 2004 resources are kept constant. This implies that
the oil price is multiplied by 2.2 compared to world GDP price for 2004–25 in the
reference scenario.
For the NAMA negotiations as well as those on agriculture, we model yearly
tariff cuts at the product (HS6) and country levels, before aggregation into the
regional and sectoral decompositions of the model (see the on-line Appendix for
details on aggregations used). This takes account of the difference between bound
and applied tariffs. In addition, we model the reduction in internal support for
agricultural products and the phasing out of export subsidies.
We also introduce trade facilitation into the analysis, modelling this as a
reduction in time at the frontier (customs procedures and time at the port).
Transportation time to/from the port can vary widely due to the different country
sizes, but no improvement is assumed for this trade cost. Our trade facilitation
experiment consists of dividing by two the processing time exceeding the median
level, for each category of trade costs (customs and port).7 Only members of the
WTO engage in the process. We assume that trade facilitation can be achieved at no
cost, although countries may incur some costs to implement it; for example, the
need to purchase modern equipment to process goods at the ports and to cope with
customs procedures.8 These costs are not incorporated into the model because
of the absence of data. However, the gains implied by a rather moderate scenario
are quite signiﬁcant and, thus, likely to outweigh any costs within a short period
of time.9 Since industrialized countries also beneﬁt from trade facilitation, they
committed to assist developing countries implement trade facilitation reforms
through the ‘aid for trade’ scheme, which will alleviate the cost of improving trade
facilitation.
7 As performance may vary considerably across regions, we group countries by continents to compute
this median and chose the closest median, world or continent, in order to avoid simulating unrealistic
improvements in Europe or Asia.
8 Trade facilitation can also generate a cost by diverting qualiﬁed people from other productive sectors.
9 See Hoekman (2014b) for a review of research on this question and a discussion of the Bali Trade
Facilitation Agreement.
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As mentioned, trade in services is another important topic for multilateral
trade negotiations, in particular in light of the presence of Global Value Chains.
We adopt here a realistic and very cautious assumption on what can be reaped in
this area. We assume a 3% reduction in protection, limited to all industrialized,
most Latin American countries, and Asia except Central Asia. Greater ambition on
this front could help ease negotiations on other topics.10
We ﬁnally take care when describing precisely the intricate series of ﬂexibilities
cushioning the impact of the formulas. We introduce ﬂexibilities for special and
sensitive products; we exempt the LDCs from tariff reductions, consolidate the
unbound tariffs, take account of all additional elements contained in the most
recent Draft Modalities, and address the speciﬁc role of sectoral initiatives (see the
on-line Appendix for detailed descriptions of the analysis).
The scenarios
Five scenarios are implemented to characterize the complexity of the negotiating
set. These scenarios are deﬁned in terms of product categories and initiatives. There
are two product categories: agricultural and non-agricultural. Services are treated
separately. Agricultural (raw agricultural and food) products correspond to 677
HS6 products in the HS classiﬁcation of 1996 used in the tariff database MAcMap.
Fisheries are part of NAMA.11
Table 1 summarizes the different shocks introduced in the exercise. In all
scenarios (unless otherwise speciﬁed), phasing out is linearly applied over a ﬁve-
year period for developed countries (ten years for developing countries). Recently
acceded members were to be granted longer periods; we make the simplifying
assumption of twelve years. The tariff cut concerns all developed countries
(including Korea) and the following developing countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. LDCs were not asked to reduce their tariffs;
they were only to increase the binding coverage. They also beneﬁt from the duty-
free, quota-free preferential access initiative according to which at least 97% of
their tariff lines will be able to enter developed countries without tariffs or quotas.
Note that this initiative has no impact in the EU case, as the Everything But Arms
initiative already ensures LDCs duty-free access.
The ﬁrst scenario concerns the effects of the modalities for agriculture and
NAMA. The three pillars for agriculture are introduced, while NAMA uses
coefﬁcients for the Swiss formula (see the on-line Appendix for details). The next
two scenarios assess what re-bundling the multilateral negotiations could mean by
10Most of the action might take place in terms of binding, which has a value per se, though not
captured by the usual modelling strategies. See Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) for more details on services in
the DDA.
11 Japan, Switzerland, Tunisia, and Turkey apply a slightly different list.
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adding services and trade facilitation. The second scenario adds a 3% reduction in
the equivalent tariff of protection on trade in services. The third scenario includes
the effects of trade facilitation, modelled along the lines noted above. We address
only customs efﬁciency improvements, which give rise to only limited implemen-
tation costs (Hoekman, 2014b). The ﬁnal two scenarios add sectorals to the mix
and illustrate how efforts to rebalance a potential deal in this way is counter-
productive. The fourth scenario focuses on sectoral initiatives for chemicals,
electronic products, and machinery. The last scenario adds to this an initiative on
environmental goods.12
3. Results
From the current period until 2025, each scenario is implemented with a
yearly step, following the liberalization schedule. Results below are presented as
deviations from the baseline for each scenario.
Too much complexity, too little gain
Table 2 shows the overall impact of our benchmark scenario. The long-run effect
of the envisaged trade liberalization in goods (only) amounts to a limited 0.09% of
world GDP annually (US$70bn in 2025).13 There is an overall increase in world
exports of goods of 1.25%, or US$230bn annually. The reason for such limited
gains has been repeatedly documented in the literature: introducing ﬂexibilities
reduces the overall impact of any deal (Jean et al., 2010). As previous GATT
Rounds led to much lower mean tariffs for goods, the focus of tariff negotiations
is now largely on remaining tariff peaks. The rather aggressive non-linear formula
Table 1. Description of the scenarios
Agriculture
+NAMA Services
Trade
facilitation
Chemicals,
electronics, &
machinery
Environmental
goods
S1 Goods x
S2 Goods& serv. x x
S3 Benchmark x x x
S4 Sectoral x x x x
S5 Environment x x x x x
12We use the WTO list of environmental products. See WTO (2011).
13 In this paper, ‘long run’ implies year 2025 even though dynamic welfare/GDP gains will continue for
longer, leading to slightly larger actual long-term gains (see Figure 1). Percentage deviations are translated
into US$ on the basis of current year value (for GDP, exports, etc.) at constant 2004 prices. Hence, the
long-run gain in US$ is the annual deviation from the baseline in 2025, at constant prices.
36 Y VA N D E C R E U X A N D L I O N E L F O N T A G N É
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745614000354
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:44:37, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
that was adopted in the DDA clashed with the political economy of the domestic
acceptability of a deal.
The implication of this ﬁrst set of aggregate results has not been taken seriously
by the negotiators: that the kind of negotiation in which they embarked was too
complex to deliver substantial gains. Not measured here is the fact that a successful
Round of multilateral negotiations would dampen the risks of a resurgence of
protectionism, either within the strict boundaries of WTO rules (e.g. an increase in
tariffs up to their bounds), at the fringes of it (generalizing contingent protection),
or outside of it (unilateral increases in protection). Such resurgence would have
a cost corresponding to a multiple of the gains considered here (Bouët and
Laborde, 2010a). Similarly, Hoekman et al. (2010) insist on the greater security
for market access that would be provided by a successful Round and dismiss
the idea of a dramatic trade liberalization associated with the completion of
the DDA.
Given the very conservative assumption of a 3% liberalization of trade in certain
services, limited to certain importers, the services scenario adds only US$15bn
gains in world GDP. In trade terms, changes are more important: we obtain an
additional US$34bn world trade. The impacts of greater ambition can be assessed,
as a ﬁrst approximation (neglecting general equilibrium effects), by simple
extrapolation.14
The beneﬁts of re-bundling the negotiation elements are evident when we add the
gains from trade facilitation. In that case, we can expect a further US$68bn annual
increase in world GDP from 2025 onwards. A large part of the additional gains
would accrue to developing economies where the scope for improved performance
in terms of custom efﬁciency and trade costs are the highest. This is consistent
Table 2. Increases per year in world GDP and exports in the long run relative
to baseline
S1 S2 S3
Agric+NAMA +Services +Trade facilitation
Exports % 1.25 1.44 1.95
Exports US$bn 230 264 359
GDP % 0.09 0.11 0.20
GDP US$bn 70 85 152
Note: Long run is 2025. Gains are in constant (2004) dollars, relative to 2025 economic values.
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE.
14 Recall that effects, for limited changes in variables, are linear.
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with econometric assessments of the potential impacts of a reduction in trade costs
(e.g., Hoekman and Nicita, 2010).
Table 3 presents these long-term GDP gains at regional or country level.15
In dollar terms, China, the EU, and Japan16 reap respectively 23%, 17%, and 15%
of world gains from a goods scenario. US gains are smaller (8% of the world total)
compared to its relative size in the world economy. Three regions suffer small
losses: the Caribbean, Mexico, and the Sub-Saharan countries due to erosion of
preferences.17
These gains are small relative to the size of the countries, raising the question
whether the potential gains justify the effort needed to obtain any deal of that kind.
Table 3. Long-run deviation from the baseline, GDP, US$mn
S1 S2 S3
Goods +Services +Trade facilitation
Argentina 694 730 890
ASEAN 6,492 7,319 12,973
Australia & New Zealand 1,401 1,545 1,714
Brazil 366 456 2,044
Canada 859 1,197 1,302
Caribbean −718 −696 131
China 15,981 18,443 36,465
EFTA 7,289 7,669 7,669
European Union 11,847 18,571 30,731
India 3,821 4,328 6,932
Japan 10,194 10,703 13,772
Korea 635 887 4,512
Mexico −473 −353 −296
North Africa 1,062 1,150 1,279
Rest of Africa (except South Africa) −549 −394 6,024
Rest of Mercosur 438 480 889
Rest of South America 977 1,057 2,533
Rest of South Asia 454 582 1,412
Rest of World 1,001 1,809 7,390
Taiwan 2,498 2,622 4,524
USA 5,344 6,450 9,480
World 69,615 84,552 152,370
Note: Long run is 2025. Gains are in constant (2004) dollars, relative to 2025 economic values.
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE.
15 Introducing port efﬁciency on the top of our modelling of trade facilitation would not change the
results qualitatively, but would add another US$34bn to world GDP. Results are not presented here for
sake of simplicity. All countries would gain − China and the EU the most.
16 Detailed analysis reveals a very signiﬁcant increase in Japanese car production.
17However, as noted below, in two of these regions (Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa – SSA) adding
trade facilitation results in a positive outcome.
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Indeed, even modest progress on the services front changes the outcome for some
of the major players. The EU and the US would increase gains by 57% and 21%,
respectively. Canada and Korea would also beneﬁt signiﬁcantly.
Lastly, re-bundling trade in goods and services with trade facilitation should
ease the negotiations. Trade facilitation results in a shift for Sub-Saharan Africa
from a limited loss (goods only) to a sizeable US$6.4bn GDP gain. Brazilian GDP
gains (compared to goods only) are multiplied by 5.6, Chinese gains by 2.3, Indian
gains by 1.8. Though developed countries would also reap beneﬁts from trade
facilitation (e.g., Korea, EU, and US), there are no clearly identiﬁable concessions
by key trading partners that could be used to increase support for the negotiations.
Hence the push for more aggressive tariff cuts through the so-called ‘sectorals’
discussed below.
A comparison of the sectoral and regional results of a scenario combining
liberalization in agriculture and manufactures as deﬁned above with services
liberalization and trade facilitation helps to understand the landing zone constraint
(see Table A-4 of the on-line Appendix for a scenario consolidating advances
on goods and rebalancing with services and trade facilitation). In agriculture,
the two main beneﬁciaries of such scenario in terms of exports are Australia
and New Zealand (+13.7%) and North Africa (+15.8%). Brazil also gains in
agriculture (+8.7%) but less than China in percentage terms given the initial levels.
The second largest gains in industrial exports behind Asia (in the range of +3% to
+4% for China, ASEAN, Korea, and Japan) are in the EU and in the US (+3.4%
for each region). Industrial exports in Argentina and Canada retrench due to the
agricultural specialization of the two countries. Interestingly, North Africa
increases strongly its export of services, but from low levels.
In terms of overall agricultural production, Australia and New Zealand beneﬁt
the most from increased exports because they are more open to international
trade (results are reported in Table A-5 of the on-line Appendix). Brazil,
Argentina, and Canada come next. EU production falls by 1.2% only. Japan
experiences a 4% decrease in agricultural production. Due to their very strong
initial protection, the EFTA countries face the strongest reduction for agriculture
production and reorient their resources toward the other sectors (with large
efﬁciency gains showing up in overall GDP gains). China and India are hardly
affected.
In the aggregate, all variations in regional-level industrial production are
below 2% (in absolute terms), the main winners being ASEAN, Japan, and
Korea. Australia, New-Zealand, and Brazil show value-added losses in industry,
offsetting gains in agriculture. Canada, the Caribbean countries, and Mexico are
also negatively affected by losing their initially favourable access to the US market
for industrial goods. Asia is the largest gainer from these changes. The US and
European industries show a negligible impact on industrial production.
Production of services is less affected, with variations of less than 1%
(in absolute terms) as a result of the Round’s limited ambitions for services.
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Rebalancing with sectorals won’t do the job
Rather than rebalancing of the agriculture and NAMA negotiations by including
services and trade facilitation, some governments sought instead to add three
broad sector-speciﬁc tariff liberalization agreements on chemicals, machinery,
and electronics (these would exclude the LDCs). Environmental goods are another
area for which sectoral negotiations were proposed (and the only one where
negotiations are currently ongoing). The data show that such attempts to ﬁx the
problem of limited and unbalanced gains do not offer a solution to the more
general problem of a badly designed negotiating agenda.
To illustrate this, we make the simplifying assumption that such sectoral
initiatives are endorsed by all developed countries (including Korea) and will
include (optimistically) a number of developing countries.18 The ﬁrst three columns
of Table 4 report the long-run change in the volume of trade (in US$bn), associated
with the scenarios discussed above. Column (1) presents the long-run changes in
world trade of agricultural and industrial goods and services compared to the
baseline, associated with a deal for agriculture and the NAMA. The US$2.6bn
increase in trade in services is a pure general equilibrium effect of this goods-only
agreement. Table 4, column (2) includes limited liberalization in services. Again, we
observe small general equilibrium effects on trade in goods. The US$35bn increase
in exchange of services is an important achievement that matches additional trade in
agricultural goods. Table 4, Column (3) illustrates that the impact of trade facilita-
tion is shared among agricultural and industrial goods, and general equilibrium
effects on trade in services are visible again. Agricultural exports increase by another
Table 4. Long-run change in the volume of trade (US$bn)
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
Agric+NAMA Services
Trade
facilitation
Chemicals, electronics,
& machinery Envt. zero
Agriculture 32.28 32.51 36.70 37.83 37.89
Industry 194.94 195.95 285.41 430.96 438.40
Services 2.61 35.23 36.42 36.41 36.29
Note: S1: agriculture + NAMA; S2: agriculture + NAMA + services; S3: agriculture + NAMA +
services + trade facilitation; S4: agriculture + NAMA + services + trade facilitation + sectorals except
environmental goods; S5: agriculture + NAMA + services + trade facilitation + sectorals including zero
tariffs initiative on environmental goods.
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE.
18 This is not very realistic, but is of course what the countries pushing the sectoral initiatives are
seeking. We chose Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, China, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. In the WTO, Korea is considered a developed
country for industrial goods, but not for agricultural goods.
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12%andmanufactured exports by another 46%. This reveals how customs red tape
and additional time costs penalizes agricultural – and potentially perishable – goods.
The last two columns of Table 4 report the long-run change in the volume of
trade for the two sectoral initiatives. They must be compared with Column 3.
Table 4 Column 4 reports a US$145.6bn increase in trade in industrial goods from
including the ﬁrst set of sectoral initiatives (chemicals, machinery, electronics). The
general equilibrium effects on agriculture remain visible, although small, and there
is no effect on trade in services. In Column 5, the sectoral initiative on environ-
mental goods is added to the three others. Its impact on trade is negligible overall,
as gains are in line with the limited product coverage of this proposal (168 HS6
lines compared with 430 for machinery, 440 for electronic products, and 910 lines
for chemicals).
Clearly, plurilateral sectoral deals are appealing from a mercantilist point of view
and this helps explain why negotiators might be tempted to push such proposals,
and may do so again in the future. But importantly, the political economy of the
sectoral initiatives is not favourable: big players like India or China, would be
confronted with a large surge in imports in key sectors if the sectorals were
adopted.19 This is illustrated for selected emerging countries and sectors in Table 5.
Table 5. Long-run change in the volume of imports (percent): selected market
and sectors
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
China Chemicals 8.61 8.62 13.41 33.25 33.22
Electronic equipment 1.69 1.68 2.23 5.42 5.38
Machinery 6.55 6.58 8.46 23.83 24.13
India Chemicals 1.94 1.93 5.67 47.65 47.63
Electronic equipment −1.03 −1.09 1.11 2.34 2.30
Machinery 8.30 8.17 11.03 61.91 62.80
Mexico Chemicals 0.14 0.13 0.09 6.69 6.57
Electronic equipment −0.10 −0.10 −0.02 4.07 4.00
Machinery 1.32 1.30 1.24 15.01 15.18
Brazil Chemicals 5.36 5.31 7.03 7.86 7.86
Electronic equipment 1.15 1.11 1.99 2.95 2.93
Machinery 5.39 5.30 6.70 7.78 7.78
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE.
19 Results on how the sectoral initiatives translate into changes in GDP by region are reported in the
on-line Appendix. With the sectoral initiative on chemicals, machinery and electronics and environment as
a whole, Indian GDP gains are largely reduced. Limited losses are also observed in Brazil. China, which has
offensive interests in certain sectors concerned by the initiatives, would gain in terms of GDP overall, but
this needs to be put in perspective of the large increase in imports in certain sectors.
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China would record a 33% increase in imports of chemicals by 2025, instead of
13% in our central scenario including trade facilitation. The corresponding ﬁgures
are 24% and 8% for Chinese imports of machinery. The import response is even
larger for India, with 47% and 62% for chemicals and machinery, respectively.
Hence, sectoral initiatives were not (and will not) be able to rebalance the
implications of the excessively complex negotiating modalities.
Conclusion
What have we learned from the failure of over a decade of market access
negotiations? The quantiﬁcation undertaken here illustrates that very complex
modalities of negotiation and ad hoc efforts to rebalance a deal may not pro-
vide any landing zone for negotiators. The combination of various formulae,
exceptions, and ﬂexibilities for goods, and ﬁnally sectoral initiatives was too
complex and offered too little visibility for negotiators as well as for civil society.
Limited gains could be expected from the negotiations on trade in goods, the main
focus of the negotiators and policy makers. All in all, the overall design of the deal
ﬁnally considered was particularly unattractive to certain big players. The ultimate
Indian attitude towards the negotiation was predictable. The quantitative results of
simulation models circulated during the DDA negotiations provided clear warnings
that were not taken seriously. From a forward-looking perspective, in our view it is
evident that greater simplicity is a necessary condition for success. Too much
ambition in terms of tariff cuts led to the introduction of a series of exceptions and
exclusions that greatly reduced potential gains. A major underlying reason for this
outcome is the inability of the WTOmembership to address the issue of coverage of
special and differential treatment and graduation from developing country status.
But negotiators also need to do a better job of bundling subjects so as to increase
the potential gains from a deal for all concerned.
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